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INTRODUCTION

Small corporations, and large ones as well, frequently borrow
money from their officers, directors, or principal shareholders, parties
who aptly can be labelled "insiders." Because insiders already are familiar with the borrower's financial situation, companies often can obtain loans from insiders more readily than they can from strangers.
Perhaps just as commonly, companies borrow from outside creditors on
the strength of the credit of insiders who guarantee repayment of the
loans. Whether an insolvent company can legitimately repay loans
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law and Hunton & Williams Professor of Law (199092), University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1950, LL.B. 1953, Vanderbilt University.
I am especially grateful to my colleagues Thomas Jackson, John Hetherington, and Saul
Levmore for their constructive comments on drafts of this Article.
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from insiders, or loans guaranteed by them, while outside creditors are
not similarly paid presents a nice question that has given considerable
difficulty.
The insider preference problem arises in both bankruptcy and
nonbankruptcy contexts, in collective proceedings, and in contests between preferred insiders and individual outside creditors. Because no
unified approach to the problem exists, the courts have reached conflicting results in insider preference cases. Legislation in some jurisdictions forbids the practice. When the legislature is silent, probably a
majority of the judicial decisions also condemn such payments, but the
reasons given are varied and subject to criticism.12 Other courts, however, find no reason to outlaw insider preferences.
I think that the context makes a difference in how courts decide
insider preference cases, and I try to explain the reasons for this in
Part II. Yet the central issue of the legitimacy of insider preferences
underlies all the cases and, in my view, deserves a more critical examination than it has received.' That question is explored in Part III. My
own conclusion is that when the law does not outlaw all preferences, to
inside and outside creditors alike, insider preferences should be judged
by whether they are in the best interest of the debtor company. However, this approach is rarely found in the decisions and is almost never
clearly articulated. If this approach to insider preferences is correct,
there remains the problem of whether to deal with the question generically, by adopting a rule, or whether to make the determination on a
case-by-case basis. If the latter course is more attractive, residual issues that involve the burden and standard of proof become important.

1. See 15A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA§§ 7468-7469 (Timothy P. Bjur & J. Jeffrey Reinholtz eds., rev. vol. 1990 & Supp.
1991). For the most part the statutory prohibitions are general rather than specifically
aimed at preferences to directors. See 15A id. §§ 7439-7465.1 (describing the statutes in
each state). Section 5(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, on the other hand,
does target preferences to insiders who have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor,
whether an individual or corporation, is insolvent. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT
TIONS

§ 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985 & Supp. 1991). The Act is discussed in Parts II and III(B).

Florida and New York had statutes specifically aimed at preferences to directors. In both
states the courts held that repeal of the statutes did not signify a legislative intent to
preclude recovery at common law. Poe & Assocs., Inc. v. Emberton, 438 So. 2d 1082, 1084
& n.7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Southern Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950
(App. Div. 1978).
2. 15A FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 7470-7471.
3. The relatively sparse commentary generally condemns these preferences. See,
GARRARD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 386 (rev. ed.
1940); John L. Campbell, Jr., Preferences by Insolvent Corporations to Officers, Direc-

e.g., 2

tors or Stockholders, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 163, 182-83 (1912); Ronald J. Kaye, Comment,
Preferences to Directors of Insolvent Corporations, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 356
(1964).
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These issues are discussed in Part IV.
II. CONTEXT
A. Bankruptcy
The legitimacy of insider preferences is least interesting in the
bankruptcy context because the current Bankruptcy Code, like most of
its predecessors, generally condemns preferences. With some notable
exceptions it provides for the recapture of preferences given on the eve
of bankruptcy whether the preferred creditor is an insider or an outsider.4 If the debtor, whether individual or corporate, is forbidden to
prefer one outsider over another, it would seem to follow that the preference of an insider will be similarly condemned. No one, I believe, has
suggested that insider preferences should be approved when preferences to outsiders are forbidden.
Yet the problem of insider preferences in bankruptcy currently is
a matter of controversy. The difficulty arises because bankruptcy law
differentiates insider preferences by extending the period of vulnerability of transfers from ninety days to one year before the petition. 5 The
logic behind this distinction is quite clear. The insider's position may
well provide the insider with an information advantage over outsiders.
By becoming aware of the debtor's financial difficulty before outside
creditors, the insider may contrive, whether by pressing for payment or
by arrangement, to be paid at a point further in time from the
6
petition.

If the insider's lengthier period of vulnerability is not itself controversial, it nonetheless is the source of a serious problem. When the
payment occurs within one year of, but outside ninety days before, the
petition and is to an outside creditor whose obligation has been guar-

4. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). The section condemns payments on account of an antecedent debt, id. § 547(b)(2), and thus does not cover contemporaneous exchanges in
which the debtor's estate gains as much as it loses. The most important, and also the
most controversial, exception to preference recapture is of a payment in the ordinary
course of business of debts so incurred. Id. § 547(c)(2).
5. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). Insiders for individual, corporate, and partnership debtors
are defined in § 101(31). If the debtor is a corporation, insiders include: directors, officers, persons in control, a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner, a general partner of the debtor, and the relatives of any "general partner, director, officer, or
person in control of the debtor." Id. § 101(31)(B) (Supp. II 1990).
6. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTCY 432 (2d ed. 1990). My colleague, John Hetherington, has suggested to me
that the lengthier period of vulnerability for insider preferences may have a perverse
effect. It may encourage insiders to begin withdrawing funds from an insolvent as soon as
insolvency is perceived when not doing so might facilitate the company's survival.
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anteed by an insider, the preference can be recaptured because it is
beneficial to the insider who, as guarantor, is a contingent creditor. 7 In
addition, several courts have ruled that the trustee can recapture the
payment from the outside creditor who is the immediate transferee because section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for recovery from
either the person benefitted or the immediate transferee.8 This outcome, of course, is upsetting to the outsider who is targeted by the
bankruptcy trustee in such circumstances. The outside creditors complain that the result makes them worse off with the guarantee than
they would have been without it." This argument ignores the fact that
the guarantee gives the outside creditors an alternative source of payment and might have figured in the debtor's decision to pay them
rather than others.
Some suggest that the outside creditor can avoid the difficulty by
persuading the guarantor to waive any claim by way of indemnity or
subrogation against the debtor at the time the guarantee is given. 10
Such a waiver would mean that the insider-guaranitor is not even contingently a creditor of the debtor; therefore, no payment outside the
ninety days can be set aside simply because it is a preference. Not surprisingly, this idea has spurred commentators to suggest invoking
fraudulent conveyance theory as a premise for recapture in this case 1
because the period of vulnerability for fraudulent transfers is also one
year. The problem is a significant one and makes the search for a theory of invalidation all the more interesting. Preference recapture, after

7. 4

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 547.04[1]

(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed.

1991 & Supp. 1991).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 550 (1988). The leading case is Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial
Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989). The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have followed Levit,
Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co. (In re C-L Cartage Co.), 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990); see
Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp. v. Lowrey (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.),
892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), aff'g Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank (In re
Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97 B.R. 77 (W.D. Okla. 1988), but a majority of courts

have taken the contrary view, see, e.g., Official Creditors' Comm. of Arundel' Hous. Components, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific, Corp. (In re Arundel Hous. Components, Inc.), 126 B.R.-

216, 218-19 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991). The Omnibus Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, 8.1985,
passed by the Senate on June 17, 1992, contains an amendment to § 550 that would
effectively overrule Levit.
9. The argument was recognized at an early stage. See Sanford Fork & Tool Co. v.
Howe, Brown & Co., 157 U.S. 312, 318 (1895).
10. See, e.g., John S. Cullina, Note, Recharacterizing Insider Preferences as
Fraudulent Conveyances: A Different View of Levit v. Ingersoll Rand, 77 VA. L. REv.
149, 156-57 (1991). Peter Borowitz attributes the idea to several commentators, the earliest of which is Leibowitz in 1985. See Peter L. Borowitz, Waiving Subrogation Rights
and Conjuring Up Demons in Response to Deprizio, 45 Bus. LAW. 2151, 2155 (1990).
Borowitz himself is critical of the waiver idea. Id. at 2155-68.
11. See, e.g., BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 6, at 449.
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all, need not be the bankruptcy trustee's only weapon. I return to this
question in Part III.
B.

Nonbankruptcy Proceedings

Statutes that condemn preferences generally are not confined to
bankruptcy. 12 When in force, they can deprive the question of the legitimacy of insider preferences of interest in much the same way as
does the bankruptcy prohibition. There is, however, a difference.
Bankruptcy is always a collective proceeding. The effect of setting
aside a preference in bankruptcy is that creditors, including the creditor whose transfer has been upset, share ratably in the debtor's estate.
Thus, preference recapture achieves equality of a sort in the treatment
of creditors. Nonbankruptcy proceedings, on the other hand, may or
may not be collective. When they are collective, the legitimacy question is the same as in bankruptcy.
When the nonbankruptcy proceeding is not collective and is
brought by an individual creditor, however, the character of the problem changes materially. In that case a rule forbidding preferences,
whether general or limited to insider preferences and whether legislative or decisional, can have the effect of subordinating the preferred
creditor's claim to that of the complaining creditor. The net effect of
doing this is to reverse the preference because the complainant steps
into the shoes of the preferred creditor. This seems an unlikely goal
when the question, absent a fraud requirement, is the preference of
one outsider over another. I suspect that even when statutes that generally forbid preferences are not clear on the point, collective distribution of anything recaptured must be contemplated.
It is not clear, however, that this premise holds true with regard to
insider preferences. Indeed, the Bankruptcy Commission explicitly
proposed subordinating the claims of insider creditors.' 3 Although it is
not phrased in subordination terms, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act provision that outlaws insider preferences has exactly that effect.
It allows any other creditor, acting alone, to sue to set aside insider
transfers or to levy on the property so transferred as if no transfer had
occurred. 4 Treating insider preferences in this fashion at the behest of

12. 15A FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7437; see, e.g., id. §§ 7438-7465.1 (surveying
state statutes).
13. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, § 4-406(a)(2) (1973).
14. Section 5(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act makes insider preferences
fraudulent if the insider has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.
UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985 & Supp. 1991). Section 7
allows a creditor to avoid such a transfer or, if the creditor has a judgment, to levy
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an individual outside creditor, however, has troubled a number of
courts. Some courts insist that the only object of avoidance is to put
both the insider and the outsider on a parity. Moreover, a desire for
parity has led other courts
to insist that all creditors be let in on the
15
benefits of recapture.
Although the subordination result is incompatible with preference
recapture based on a theory of equality, it might be defended on the
basis of a different underpinning. Courts could use subordination to
sanction or deter perceived wrongdoing. For example, the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act deals with transfers labelled "fraudulent." Of
course, the so-called fraud is often constructive rather than actual, and
it is not clear from the commentary accompanying the Act why an insider preference might be perceived as a wrong that merits demotion to
junior status.16 Alternatively, subordination, or priority, could be justified on the basis that the subordinated claim somehow has less intrinsic merit than its competitor.' 7 This rationale might have been the basis of the Bankruptcy Commission's proposal, but the Commission
offered no explanation in its report. Once again, the theory of invalidation would seem an important ingredient in assessing the appropriate
effect of invalidation.
The difference outside bankruptcy between individual and collective proceedings is significant in another respect. Individual creditors
sue in their own right or as representatives of all creditors. In the collective proceedings, such as receiverships or assignments for the benefit
of creditors, the claimant acts not only as a representative of all creditors, but also as a successor of the debtor company. As I will show, the
claimant's status is germane to the question of standing.
In dealing with insider preferences, context and theory are interrelated. Yet it is far from clear that the relationship always has been
perceived. The distinction between equality and priority is central to
any examination of a theory that underlies the recapture of insider

execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds. Id. § 7, 7A U.L.A. at 660.
15. See 15A FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7594. In Roseboom v. Warner, 23 N.E. 339
(11. 1890), the court seemed content with a preferential result favoring the outsider who
began his suit by an attachment. Id. at 341. In Williams v. Jackson County Patrons of
Husbandry, 23 Mo. App. 132 (1886), the court took an apparently intermediate position
and said that a single creditor could sue and share the recovery ratably with the insider
if other creditors did not intervene. Id. at 147.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 53-63. In discussing the Bankruptcy Commission's subordination proposal, Dean Robert Clark suggested that it might have been
founded on the belief that fraud was simply too difficult to establish. Robert C. Clark,
The Duties of the CorporateDebtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 538 (1977).
He took no position on the wisdom of the proposal. See id. at 536-40.
17. For example, the advance of the insider might be seen as a contribution to
capital that is junior to the claims of creditors.
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preferences.
III.

THEORIES OF INVALIDATION

In examining the various theories on which insider preferences
have been condemned, it is important to make two assumptions: 1)
That the corporation is free to prefer one of two or more outside creditors,'" and 2) that the underlying obligation to the insider is legitimate.
Unless the latter is the case, invalidation of the preference may be a
response to the transaction giving rise to the obligation rather than to
the payment itself. The validity of the underlying obligation is a different question.
Judicial decisions on insider preferences began to appear in the
middle of the nineteenth century as corporate activity became more
common and encountered financial downturns. The early cases yielded
a variety of theories. The variety probably stemmed in part from the
fact that the corporate form of enterprise was relatively new and
problems that involved an artificial entity took time to resolve. Also,
the fact that the cases arose in a number of different jurisdictions
probably was a contributing factor. Many cases were decided in state
courts. Federal courts were not far behind, and they applied federal
common law under the aegis of Swift v. Tyson.'9 Moreover, no bankruptcy statute was on the books; the 1841 Act had been quickly repealed and was not replaced until 1867.20 In struggling to work out a
solution to a new problem, different courts quite often offered different
explanations. They also arrived at different outcomes.
A third reason for the variety lies in the struggle of the courts to
find an acceptable theory of liability. At the heart of this struggle is
the problem of establishing what sort of duty, if any, the insider owes
to the outside creditor. Once that is settled, determining whether there
has been a breach of that duty is often straightforward.

18. This point was made earlier in considering the context in which preferences are
judged. If preferences are generally condemned, the illegitimacy of insider preferences
automatically follows. See supra text preceding, accompanying, and following note 4.

19. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). Swift held that federal courts were not obliged to apply state decisional law except on matters of local law. State statutes, on the other hand, were binding in federal
court. Id. at 18-19.
20. The 1841 Act, adopted on August 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, was repealed on
March 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. The 1867 Act was adopted on March 2, 1867, ch. 176,
14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
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A. Fraud
The earliest cases that directly focused on insider preferences sustained their validity. At the same time these courts made it clear that
fraud could vitiate such transfers. A good example is the first insider
preference case that my research uncovered: Central Rail Road &
Banking Co. v. Claghorn,21 which was decided in South Carolina in
1844. In Claghorn the court sustained the grant of several mortgages
securing already existing obligations that were indorsed by the directors of the corporate debtor when it was not clear that the company
was insolvent when the mortgages were granted. 22 In regard to insider
preferences the court stated, "When the question of priority arises, it
must depend on the bona fides of the transaction, fraud or no fraud. If
by greater diligence, and without fraud, he [the insider] has fairly
gained an advantage over the other creditors, he [the insider] is entitled to retain it ....1,23
Faithful to that prophecy, courts soon began to upset insider preferences attended by fraudulent conduct. Two decisions of the United
States Supreme Court are illustrative, In Koehler v. Black River Falls
Iron Co.,24 a frequently cited 1862 decision, directors mortgaged corpo-

rate property to secure antecedent debts owed to themselves. The
mortgages had been authorized for the purpose of securing new loans
and not for securing antecedent debts. Furthermore, the corporate seal
had been improperly used on the mortgage. The Court did not hesitate
to strike down the mortgage.2 5 It is noteworthy
that the shareholders,
26
and not the creditors, were the complainants.
Similarly, in 1868 in Drury v. Cross,27 another often-cited decision,
the directors gave $280,000 of previously unissued bonds as additional
security for a $21,000 debt that was indorsed by four directors and already secured by $42,000 in bonds. This occurred while a suit on the
indorsement was pending against the directors. The creditor had not
sought additional security. Next, the directors persuaded the creditor

21. 17 S.C. Eq. (1 Speers Eq.) 545 (Ct. App. 1844). Not far behind in sustaining
insider preferences were: (1) Massachusetts, Sargent v. Webster, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 497,
503-04 (1847); (2) Vermont, Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425, 443-45 (1848); and (3) Missouri, see City of St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo. 483, 524 (1856) (Ryland, J.).
22. Claghorn, 17 S.C. Eq. (1 Speers Eq.) at 554.
23. Id. at 562-63.
24. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715 (1862).
25. Id. at 718.
26. Id. at 716. The Court said that the directors owed a duty of trust to the suing
shareholders. Id. at 720-21. This idea is close to the fiduciary-duty-to-the-corporation

theory discussed in Part III(F).
27. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 299 (1868).
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to bring a foreclosure suit against the company. The directors then arranged to have confederates buy- the claim and its security from the
creditor for about two-thirds the amount of the claim. The Court
found that the directors granted the additional security to deter bidders at the foreclosure sale. By creating a price in excess of $300,000,
the directors ensured that their confederates could acquire all the
debtor company's assets. This elaborate scheme was deemed fraudulent" and, at the behest of a judgment creditor of the debtor company,
the Court defeated the transfer to the confederates 2 who had resold
the collateral, which was all of the debtor's property, at a significant
profit.
These decisions and the warnings that preceded them seem unremarkable to me. Fraud had long been actionable. What is interesting
was the Court's failure to invoke fraudulent conveyance statutes. As we
will see, that was to come later.
B.

Fraudulent Conveyance

It is only a small step from fraud to fraudulent conveyance and a
natural one as well because the insider preference necessarily involves
a transfer. Surprisingly, however, courts were slow to invoke fraudulent
conveyance legislation against insider preferences. Other theories were
available outside bankruptcy that did not present the problems of
proof inherent in showing fraud. Bankruptcy law might have seemed to
restrict avoidance to fraudulent conveyances or preferences, at least
when the analysis was limited to the duty owed to a creditor, but no
bankruptcy law was in effect between 1878 and 1898.30 Ultimately,
however, and perhaps because of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, such provisions became the basis of avoidance, on both actual and constructive
fraud grounds.
1.

Actual Fraud

Another possible explanation for the delay lies in the distinction

28. Id. at 303-04.
29. Id. at 305.
30. The 1867 Bankruptcy Act, Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, was
amended in 1874, Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, and repealed in 1878, Act of
June 7, 1978, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. Bankruptcy law became permanent with the enactment of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act on July 1, 1898, An Act To Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy Throughout the United States, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898), repealed

by An Act To Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, tit. IV § 401, 92
Stat. 2682 (1978), and replaced by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (the
current Bankruptcy Code).
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between preferences and fraudulent conveyances, at least as fraudulent
conveyance law stood in the nineteenth century. A preference distributes the debtor's assets to a favored creditor. The prohibition of preferences is based on a principle of equality among creditors. An insolvent debtor contemplating bankruptcy should not pay one creditor at
the expense of another. However, preferential payments to a creditor
before bankruptcy are usually valid at the time of payment. Preference
avoidance makes sense only when the debtor's financial failure is thereafter dealt with collectively. There the recaptured preference is distributed ratably to all creditors, thus achieving equality.
On the other hand, a fraudulent conveyance keeps the debtor's assets from creditors. The idea underlying fraudulent conveyance law, as
far as actual fraud is concerned, is that debtors should not try to keep
nonexempt assets for themselves, or try to give their assets away before
paying their obligations. Debtors who transfer property with the intention of keeping value for themselves or of giving value away while insolvent commit an offense at the time the transfer is made. A creditor
who is disadvantaged by actual fraud rightly can seek to avoid the
fraud's effect by recapturing the transferred property.3 1 The difficulty
with using fraudulent conveyance law in insider preference cases is
that by paying a legitimate debt, the debtor is neither keeping value
for itself nor giving it away in disregard of its other obligations.
However, if one ignores the proposition that corporations and insiders are separate entities, with the former owing the latter, the insider transfer becomes a method by which insiders keep property for
themselves rather than applying it to their obligations. Treating the
insider and the corporation as a single entity is most tempting when
the inside creditor is also the sole owner of the corporation. I believe
that thinking of the corporation and the insider as one is what led
courts to use fraudulent conveyance theory to attack insider
preferences.
In the twentieth century courts began, albeit somewhat grudgingly, to use fraudulent conveyance theory in insider preference cases.
Virginia case law provides a good illustration. Confronted in 1884 with
a case in which a company paid an obligation indorsed by a director,
the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals followed a line of cases that
upheld insider preferences in the absence of actual fraud. 32 In 1907 and
1908, however, the court held that the intent to prefer any creditor in
contemplation of bankruptcy was actual fraud in violation of the bank-

31. The distinction between preferences and fraudulent conveyances is drawn in
essentially the same way in THoMAs H. JACKSON, THE LocIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW 123-26 (1986).
32. See Planters Bank v. Whittle, 78 Va. 737, 739-42 (1884).
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ruptcy provision banning fraudulent transfers.33 Yet in a 1921 case that
involved an individual debtor, rather than a corporate debtor, the
court refused to find that the intent to prefer certain creditors always
will amount to actual fraud.3 4 Finally, in 1963 the court found that a
corporation had an actual intent to defraud and had violated the
state's fraudulent conveyance statute, the equivalent of the Statute of
Elizabeth, 35 when the insolvent corporation transferred its accounts receivable to an officer-director to satisfy an obligation owed to the officer-director.3 6 The court could not point to any fraudulent behavior
of the sort detected in Koehler or Drury. Apparently, the actual fraud
turned solely on the fact that an insider was preferred.3 7 Curiously,
Virginia continues to uphold as legitimate payments to creditors whose
38
obligations are guaranteed by insiders.
The difficulty with attacking insider preferences as actually fraudulent is precisely what had troubled the Virginia court. Is an intent to
prefer an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud? Certainly the intent to
prefer is not a debtor's attempt to retain property rather than pay its
debts, for the debtor is paying a legitimate debt. To use the words of
Dean Robert Clark, insider preferences do not violate the "ideals of
Truth and Respect toward creditors"3 9 that fraudulent conveyance law
reflects. Insider preferences offend only the less rigorously enforced an-

33. Webb's Trustee v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 56 S.E. 581, 582-83 (Va. 1907), aff'd on
reh'g, 60 S.E. 130 (Va. 1908) (holding that bankrupt's intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
is a question of fact).
34. Surratt v. Eskridge, 108 S.E. 677, 680 (Va. 1921) (holding that intent to prefer
is not necessarily intent to "hinder, delay or defraud" creditors within the meaning of §
67(e) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act).
35. 13 Eliz. c.5 (1570) (Eng.).
36. Darden v. George G. Lee, Co., 129 S.E.2d 897 (Va. 1963) (holding that an insider preference violates § 55-80, VA. CODE ANN. § 55-80 (Michie 1986), which requires an
intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors). The Fourth Circuit followed Darden in
Regal Ware, Inc. v. Fidelity Corp., 550 F.2d 934 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977), a case in which a parent company received a preference from its subsidiary.
37. See Darden, 129 S.E.2d at 899-900. The court stated: "'The obvious and inevitable effect of this transaction was to delay and hinder the creditor, the company, from
satisfying its claim.. . . Under Sec. 55-80 of the Code, a conveyance or assignment may
be made with intent to hinder or delay, without any intent absolutely to defraud.'" Id.
at 900 (quoting lower court opinion); cf. Duberstein v. Werner, 256 F. Supp. 515
(E.D.N.Y. 1966) (discussing actual fraud under § 67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988)) and noting that some question about the
legitimacy of the underlying debt existed).
38. Bank of Commerce v. Rosemary & Thyme, Inc., 239 S.E.2d 909 (Va. 1978). For
a helpful analysis of the Virginia cases, see Joseph E.Ulrich, Fraudulent Conveyances
and Preferences in Virginia, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 51 (1979). Professor Ulrich discussed the theory that insider preferences are a breach of fiduciary duty to creditors. Id.
at 65-67. This theory is discussed in Part III(F).
39. Clark, supra note 16, at 511.
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2. Constructive Fraud
The most prominent form of constructive fraud is a transfer by an
insolvent debtor for inadequate consideration. This ground for setting
aside transfers, which was the creation of Chancellor Kent,41 is based
on the combination of two ideas: Asset depletion injures creditors even
in the absence of actual fraudulent intent, and transferees can be required to relinquish the property without injury if they are given a lien
on the property that secures repayment of whatever consideration they
gave in exchange for the property. The concept is a compromise that
steers a course between the extremes of no avoidance and total avoidance. 42 Its application to insider preferences is not obvious because the
release of the claim by the transferee-creditor would appear to be adequate consideration for the transfer regardless of whether the transferee-creditor is an insider or an outsider who is guaranteed by an
insider.
In codifying the constructive fraud concept, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 43 and later the Bankruptcy Act, as amended by
the Chandler Act,4 4 added an additional limitation, the requirement of

good faith.45 Courts soon discovered that they could rule that a transfer to an insider was not made in good faith and therefore was constructively fraudulent. Perhaps the best known, although not the
first,"s case to use this concept of good faith was Bullard v. Aluminum

Co. of America,'47 a 1972 Seventh Circuit decision. It set aside the payment by an insolvent company of a debt that the company's principal

40. Id. Dean Clark acknowledged that the ideal of evenhandedness expressed by
preference law "has never been considered as important to the functioning of the com-

mercial system, which constitutes the essence of our culture, as the ideals of Truth and
Respect." Id. at 515.
41. See Boyd & Suydam v. Dunlap, 1 Johns. Ch.478 (N.Y. Ch. 1815).
42. For a discussion of the history and development of this aspect of constructive
fraud, see John C. McCoid, II, Constructively Fraudulent Conveyances: Transfers for
Inadequate Consideration,62 Tax. L. REV. 639 (1983).
43. § 4, 7A UL.A. 427, 474 (1985).
44. § 67d(2)(a), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 548

(1988)).
45. Good faith was part of the definition of fair consideration in the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, § 3(a), 7A U.L.A. 427, 448 (1918), and the Chandler Act,

§ 67d(1)(e), ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938).
46. The earliest known case was Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men v. Lester, 433 P.2d
901 (Wash. 1967) (using lack of good faith in the context of fraudulent conveyance law

because the transfer was more than four months before the appointment of a receiver).
47. 468 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972).
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owner had guaranteed.4 8 Why the payment of a legitimate obligation is
not a good faith transaction is not immediately apparent from this line
of cases. To say that it involves taking unconscionable advantage of
other creditors49 begs the question.
The 1984 revision of the uniform law5" and the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code5 omitted the good faith requirement, which was the key to invalidation under this statutory theory.52 The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, however, explicitly condemns insider preferences by an insolvent debtor, whether individual or corporate, if the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent when the
transfer was made.5 3 The commentary that accompanies the provision
does not provide an underlying thesis. It merely cites three cases, Garrard Glenn's Treatise, and a HarvardLaw Review case note. 4 Two of
the cases involved behavior that smacks of actual fraud. In Mitchell v.
Travis (In re Jackson Sound Studios, Inc.)55 it was not clear that the
corporation had authorized the transfer of a security interest, and in
any event, the corporation had withheld the transfer from the public
record for almost two years.5 6 Twentieth St. Bank v. Sharitz (In re
Lamie Chemical Co.)57 involved mortgages that were withheld from
the public record with the intent of bolstering the company's credit.5 s
The third case, Stuart v. Larson,5 9 was based on a breach of fiduciary

48. Id. at 13-14 (stating that lack of good faith alone can void a transfer and finding that transfers made to benefit third parties are not made for fair consideration
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act); see Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215 (7th
Cir. 1976) (holding that payments of commissions to the president while the corporation
was insolvent were not made in good faith).
49. The Lester court determined that the "intent to take unconscionable advantage of others" indicated a lack of good faith. 433 P.2d at 904; accord Southern Indus.,
Inc. v. Jeremias, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945, 949 (App. Div. 1978); see Note, Good Faith and
Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARV. L. REV. 495, 499-502 (1983).
50. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 643, 657 (1985). The Act's
piefatory note says that elimination of the good faith requirement was designed to track
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 641 prefatory note.
51. An Act to Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies,
§ 548(a)(2)(A), 92 Stat. 2549, 2600 (1978) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)
(1988)) (replacing fair consideration standard with reasonably equivalent value
standard).
52. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 7, 1 548.01, at 548-14 n.12 (recognizing that cases such as Bullard are modified).
53. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AT § 5(b), 7A U.L.A. 639, 657 (1985).
54. Id. at 658 cmt. 2.
55. 473 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1973).
56. Id. at 504-05.
57. 296 F. 24 (4th Cir. 1924).
58. Id. at 28.
59. 298 F. 223 (8th Cir. 1924).
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duty to creditors.6 0 Garrard Glenn was willing to support the condemnation of insider preferences either on the breach-of-fiduciary-duty-tocreditors theory or on the theory that the preference impairs corporate
credit.6 " As Glenn acknowledged, the impairment-of-credit argument
was advanced in the student note,6 2 which was the additional source
cited by the uniform act commentary.6
3. Recharacterization
Since the Levit v. Ingersoll Rand FinancialCorp.64 decision, commentators have advanced still another fraudulent conveyance theory
that is applicable when an insider has guaranteed the company's obligation to an outsider. Under the rubric of recharacterization, they suggest that the company's payment to the outsider amounts to a gift to
the insider at the expense of other creditors.6 5 Underlying this argument is the view, best expressed by my colleague Thomas Jackson, that
a fraudulent conveyance is a transfer that depletes the assets available
to creditors while a preference is a distribution of the debtor's assets
among creditors.66 In Jackson's view the debtor's payment to the guaranteed creditor falls in the former category because it deprives the
creditors as a group, including the guaranteed creditor, of the funds
that could be extracted from the insider guarantor and thus reduces
the pool of funds available to all creditors. On the other hand, if the
guaranteed creditor, who is indifferent as to the source of payment,
gets payment from the guarantor, more of the debtor's assets will be
available to all creditors.6 7 Essentially, recharacterization requires the
guaranteed creditor to look first to the security of the guaranty. In that
respect recharacterization bears a clear resemblance to marshaling, although the marshaling doctrine is normally confined to secured
claims s and operates to benefit junior secured creditors."

60. Id, at 227-29. For a discussion of this theory, see infra part III(F)(1).
61. 2 GLENN, supra note 3, § 386, at 667.
62. Recent Case, 38 HARV. L. REV. 521, 521-22 (1925).
63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
64. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
65. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 6, at 449; Borowitz, supra note 10, at 215556; Cullina, supra note 10, at 149-80. For a slightly different characterization of insider
preferences, see Andrew J. Nussbaum, Comment, Insider Preferencesand the Problem
of Self-Dealing Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 603 (1990) (combining
concepts of actual fraud and self-dealing).
66. Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725,
777-80 (1984).
67. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 6, at 449.
68. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 10.9,
at 723 n.2 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1989).
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It is not clear that the other creditors should have the right to
force the guaranteed creditor to seek payment first from the insiderguarantor. Unlike junior secured creditors in marshaling, unsecured
outside creditors have no property interest in the debtor's assets that is
depleted if the debtor pays the guaranteed creditor from them. More
importantly, it is noteworthy that a direct payment by a debtor company to an insider creditor does not fit the recharacterization mould
because it simply would be a distribution to a creditor, albeit a preferential one. Because I can see no difference in principle between a payment to an insider creditor and a payment to a creditor who is guaranteed by an insider-a view I think Jackson shares 7q-I doubt the
theory. Its defect, I think, is that it ignores the fact that the debtor
company owed the outside creditor and was the true beneficiary of the
credit that the outsider originally extended. Viewed in this way, the
debt6r's payment to the guaranteed creditor hardly seems more a gift
to the insider than a payment to a creditor, even if the insider has
waived indemnity and subrogation rights.71 It is, I believe, just a maldistribution among creditors.
In short, in the absence of additional circumstances that go beyond a simple insider preference, fraudulent conveyance theory does
not seem to provide a satisfactory explanation for setting aside these
transfers. Neither the actual fraud nor constructive fraud label adequately differentiates the ordinary preference to an outside creditor,
which is usually accepted as proper outside a collective proceeding.
Recharacterization ignores the fact that the debtor's payment is made
on account of an antecedent obligation.
C. Inequity
Some courts have tried to address insider preferences in simpler
and more straightforward terms. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for
example, said that outlawing insider preferences was based merely
"[u]pon the plainest principles of right, fair dealing, and common honesty."'72 The Eighth Circuit put the matter in much the same fashion:
"The law applicable to this situation is not difficult. It is merely com-

69. Id. at 727.
70. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 6, at 448-49 (noting that the insider benefits
from both transfers).
71. This problem with recharacterization was identified in Nussbaum, supra note
65, at 625. The author resorted to a theory of actual fraud as a means of getting around
the fact that a creditor is paid. Id.

72. Taylor v. Mitchell, 83 N.W. 418, 420 (Minn. 1900). A federal circuit court in
Missouri deemed the practice "piracy." Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotton Exch.

Real-Estate Co., 70 F. 155, 160 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1895).
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mon sense
and common honesty, applied in the interest of fair
7
dealing."

1

Such statements are not very revealing about what makes an insider preference unfair or dishonest. After echoing these comments an
Indiana
federal judge, in Howe, Brown & Co. v. Sanford Fork & Tool
74
Co.,

was able to point to exactly why he thought directors should be

restricted:
It seems to me enough to say that a sound public policy and a sense of
common fairness forbid that the directors or managing agents of a
business corporation, when disaster has befallen or threatens the enterprise, shall be permitted to convert their powers of management
and their intimate, and it may be, exclusive, knowledge of the corporate affairs into means of self-protection to the harm of other
creditors. 7"
Thus, in the court's view a director's informational advantage and control of the debtor company are the factors that make insider preferences inequitable. One contemporary authority even asserts that these
factors are still the chief explanation for banning insider preferences. 6
Others have looked at these same factors, however, and reached
the opposite conclusion. In 1848 the Vermont Supreme Court recognized these positional advantages and said:
The stockholder and the stranger, who are both creditors of a corporation, no doubt stand in very unequal positions. But it is an inequality
which the law allows, and which is understood by those who contract
with corporations, and one which will always tend, more or less, to
bring in doubt the credit of such bodies.77But it is a subject, with
which this court [will] have nothing to do.

The author might well have noted that life in general is unfair because
it equips some better than others for meeting vicissitudes. Some run
faster. Some jump higher. Some are smarter. Some are simply in the
73. Jackman v. Newbold, 28 F.2d 107, 111 (8th Cir. 1928).
74. 44 F. 231 (C.C.D. Ind. 1890) (finding it unnecessary to accept a trust-fund-forcreditors theory), rev'd, 157 U.S. 312 (1895).

75. Id. at 233. The Wyoming Supreme Court also identified these positional advantages in Harle-Haas Drug Co. v. Rogers Drug Co., 113 P. 791, 796 (Wyo. 1911).
76. 15A FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7469.
Generally, the rule prohibiting preferences to directors is not founded
upon the trust fund doctrine, but upon the theory that it is inequitable that
directors, whose knowledge of conditions and power to act for the corporation
give them an advantage, should be permitted to protect their own claims to the
detriment of others at a time when it is apparent that all the unsecured debts
of the corporation are equally in peril and that all of them cannot be paid.
Id. at 262.
77. Whitwell v. Warner, 20 Vt. 425, 444-45 (1848).
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right place at the right time.
If one is prepared to allow preferences between outside creditors,
information and power may not be persuasive reasons for prohibiting
insider preferences. Some outsiders, a bank with setoff power and
knowledge of the status of the debtor company's account for example,
have similar control and informational advantages. Moreover, it is difficult to see how insider preferences are any more injurious to the disfavored creditors than preferences to other outsiders. They are different
only in the sense that one might expect insider preferences, if held legitimate, to occur more often because of the positional advantages that
insiders enjoy. It is easier, perhaps, to imagine the insider quickly saying "I choose me" than it is to visualize the insider picking and choosing between outsiders. Yet I suspect that the choice between outsiders
is often easy enough. For example, choosing the indispensable trade
creditor over the tax claimant is not a hard choice. Self-interest guides
both decisions. Surely, it explains most conscious decisions to prefer or
be preferred. Even if the frequency of insider preferences is greater,
frequency alone is not a sufficiently satisfying distinction between legality and illegality.
D. Agent-Trustee
According to my research, the first case to hold an insider preference invalid was the 1861 decision of Richards v. New Hampshire Insurance Co. 78 The court's analysis was different because it focused on
the insiders' special relation to the outsiders. In Richards the insured
plaintiffs sued the directors of an insurer who, with the proceeds of an
assessment, had paid claims of other insureds on which the directors
were personally liable. Although the preferred claims apparently had
arisen before the plaintiffs' claims, the New Hampshire court gave no
priority to claims first in time and held that the company should have
applied its assets ratably to all claims. The court stated that "when the
corporations become embarrassed or insolvent, the directors may not
apply the assets to exonerate themselves and leave the other creditors
without remedy. '7' The court acknowledged, however, that an individual debtor can prefer one creditor over another.8 0
Why the distinction? The court was not completely clear on this
point, but an explanation may be inferred from an earlier New Hampshire case that the court cited. In Colby v. Copp"1 the court required a

78. 43 N.H. 263 (1861).

79. Id. at 265.
80. Id. at 264.
81. 35 N.H. 434 (1857).
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creditor who held both an individual claim and a claim owed jointly to
another and himself to apply ratably a payment received from the
debtor, who had not designated how to allocate his payment.8 2 The
Colby court characterized the recipient of the payment as an agent or
trustee for his fellow creditor and stated that "every agent and trustee,
who has claims of his own, must be regarded as agent for himself and
others, and bound to give his diligence and care equally to all the
claims in his hands . . . whether of his own or others, in just proportion to their amounts. 83 The fact that Colby dealt with the allocation

obligation of a recipient rather than a payor did not give the Richards
court pause.8 4 Nor did the court explain why the directors were considered agents or trustees of outside creditors. The court simply stated
that the "defendants were such agents and trustees" and then announced the rule. 5
Richards also became a much-cited case. Its creation of a special
relationship between the preferred insider and the complaining outsider provided a new approach. Moreover, its characterization of the
directors as trustees was prophetic because the trust-fund theory became the dominant justification for setting aside insider preferences.
E.

Trust Fund for Creditors

The theoretical basis for upsetting insider preferences that dominated the balance of the nineteenth century was the proposition that
the assets of an insolvent corporation are a fund held in trust for the
benefit of creditors. 88 In Bradley v. Farwell,7 an 1874 decision by a
federal circuit court sitting in Massachusetts, bankruptcy assignees
sued to set aside an insolvent company's transfer of bonds to secure
the antecedent claim of a partnership because one of the insolvent

82. Id. at 436.
83. Id. at 436-37.
84. See Richards, 43 N.H. at 264. A joint obligee who receives a payment from the
obligor surely would have at least a fiduciary obligation to the other obligee to apply the
payment ratably between the two obligations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 259(3) (1979). The corollary, a right of the debtor to pay one of the joint obligees with
the expectation that the payee will share with the other obligee, is assumed in 4 ARTHUR
L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 941 (1951 & Supp. 1991) (stating that rendering performance to one joint obligee reduces or satisfies the obligation for all joint obligees).
85. Richards, 43 N.H. at 265.
86. In 1880 dictum the United States Supreme Court described an insolvent corporation as "so far civilly dead, that its property may be administered as a trust-fund for
the benefit of its stockholders and creditors." Graham v. Railroad Co., 102 U.S. 148, 161
(1880).

87. 3 F. Cas. 1146 (C.C.D. Mass. 1874) (No. 1,779). The transfer was outside the
period in which all prebankruptcy preferences were vulnerable. Id. at 1148-49.
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company's directors was also a member of the partnership.,8 The court
invoked the trust-fund theory to overrule the defendants' demurrer to
the assignees' bill in equity. 9 The court cited Curran v. Arkansas,90 an
1853 United States Supreme Court decision that did not concern insider preferences and was part of a line of precedents that originated
with an 1824 opinion by Justice Story.
While sitting on circuit, Justice Story, in Wood v. Dummer, 1 formulated the trust-fund theory to control the question of the legitimacy, as against creditors of an insolvent bank, of the bank's distribution to shareholders. Based on the trust-fund theory, he ruled that
such a distribution was impermissible.92 The capital stock of the bank
was, he said, "to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the payment of
the debts contracted by the bank."93
Even in its original context, the trust-fund theory generally has
been rejected. 94 It is one thing to say that, upon insolvency, creditors
have priority over shareholders. It is quite different to insist that a
corporation be managed for the sole benefit of creditors, even when the
corporation is insolvent. After all, the shareholders are still the legal
and equitable owners.
In the context of preferences the trust-fund theory has at least two
further difficulties. If carried to its logical end, the trust-fund theory
also would prevent a preference of one outsider over another, for a
trustee cannot prefer one trust beneficiary over another without the
authorization of the trust instrument. In fact, some courts that applied
the trust-fund theory to insider preferences implied that it extended as
well to outsider cases. 95 Moreover, in bankruptcy it would condemn
preferences without regard to the preference's proximity in time to the

88. Id. at 1148.
89. Id. at 1150-51.
90. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853). The Bradley court also cited Koehler v. Black
River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 715 (1862), and Drury v. Cross, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
299 (1868). These cases are discussed in Part III(A) of this Article and involve actual
fraud. There was no indication of actual fraud in Bradley, and the court disclaimed any
intent to invoke constructive fraud. Bradley, 3 F. Cas. at 1149, 1150.
91. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944).
92: Id. dt 436-37.
93. Id. at 436.
94. E.g., Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383-86 (1893); George
T. Smith Middlings Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U.S. 237, 241 (1890); Fogg v. Blair,
133 U.S. 534, 541 (1890); Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Ham, 114 U.S. 587, 594-96 (1885);
15A FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 7369 (noting that the trust-fund theory has been repudiated and is merely a term used to describe the equitable duties imposed on a receiver or
court in assignments for the benefit of creditors).
95. See, e.g., Beach v. Miller, 22 N.E. 464, 466 (Ill. 1889); Haywood v. Lincoln
Lumber Co., 26 N.W. 184, 186 (Wis. 1885).
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filing of the petition.
Whatever its merits, the trust-fund theory caught on in both creditor-shareholder priority cases and insider preference cases. It was used
over and over and is a good example of how a catchy phrase or the
reputation of a jurist sometimes can stand in the way of thoughtful
inquiry. Even today, the theory is not entirely dead, although its defects are widely recognized.
F.
1.

FiduciaryDuty
Owed to Creditors

If the assets of an insolvent corporation are treated as a fund held
in trust and if the corporation's creditors are the beneficiaries of that
trust, then the officers and directors, who are the managers of the corporation, are the trustees. Trustees, of course, have fiduciary obligations to beneficiaries that must be observed. It was, I believe, precisely
this line of thought that frequently led courts to the proposition that
an insider preference is a breach of fiduciary duty owed by directors to
creditors0 6 A number of courts began to justify voiding insider preferences on both the trust-fund-for-creditors theory and the fiduciaryduty-to-creditors theory. Haywood v. Lincoln Lumber Co.,97 an 1885
Wisconsin case, is an early example of a court linking the fiduciaryduty concept and the trust-fund idea in the insider preference arena.9 s
Similarly, Beach v. Miller9 and Roseboom v. Warner,100 from Illinois
in 1889 and 1890 respectively, and Olney v. Conanicut Land Co., 0 1 an
1889 Rhode Island decision, combined talk of trust fund and fiduciary
duty concepts.
If the two ideas initially were intertwined, they did not remain so.
As the trust-fund theory withered, courts increasingly talked simply of

96. An intermediate formulation was that the directors were "trustees for the creditors," which left out the fund aspect and implied a fiduciary duty. E.g., Bird v. Magowan, 43 A. 278, 280 (N.J. Ch. 1898). English courts were divided on whether directors
were trustees for creditors even without Justice Story's influence. Compare Gaslight Improvement Co. v. Terrell, 10 L.R.-Eq. 168, 175-76 (1870) (describing an insider preference as a "breach of trust" owed to creditors) with In re Wincham Shipbuilding, Boiler,
& Salt Co., 9 Ch.D. 322, 328 (1878) ("[D]irectors are not trustees for the creditors of the
company.").
97. 26 N.W. 184 (Wis. 1885).
98. Id. at 186-87. Victor Morawetz's treatise was an early and influential secondary
authority connecting the trust fund and fiduciary duty concepts. 2 VICTOR MORAwETz, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 787-788 (2d ed. 1886).
99. 22 N.E. 464, 466 (Ill.
1889).
100. 23 N.E. 339, 341 (Ill. 1890).
101. 18 A. 181, 182 (R.I. 1889).
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a fiduciary duty, usually owed to both shareholders and creditors. An
early example is Taylor v. Mitchell,0 2 a Minnesota case, which spoke
10 3
of unfairness but also talked of the directors' fiduciary obligation.
0
Twenty-four years later the Eighth Circuit, in Stuart v. Larson,14
could simply state that directors owed a fiduciary duty to shareholders
and creditors.'0 5 Many similar pronouncements were made in the
interim. 0 6
Perhaps the best-known case to announce that corporate officers
07
and directors owe a fiduciary duty to creditors is Pepper v. Litton.1
In that case the United States Supreme Court subordinated the claim
of an insider thought to be guilty of "a scheme to defraud creditors
reminiscent of some of the evils with which 13 Eliz. c. 5 was designed
to cope."' 0 8 But Justice Douglas went well beyond a fraud justification
for his decision:
[A] gufficient consideration may be simply the violation of rules of fair
play and good conscience by the claimant; a breach of the fiduciary
standards of conduct which he owes the corporation, its stockholders
and creditors. He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first and his cestuis second. He cannot manipulate the affairs of
his corporation to their detriment and in disregard of the standards of
common decency and honesty. He cannot by the intervention of a corporate entity violate the ancient precept against serving two masters.
He cannot by the use of the corporate device avail himself of privileges normally permitted outsiders in a race of creditors. He cannot
utilize his inside information and his strategic position for his own
preferment.. . . He cannot use his power for his personal advantage
and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no matter how
absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how meticulous
he is to satisfy technical requirements. For that power is at all times
subject to the equitable limitation that it may not be exercised for the
aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis. 09
Although the language contained clear overtones of fraud and inequity,
Justice Douglas ultimately rested the result on a breach of fiduciary
duty.

102. 83 N.W. 418 (Minn. 1900).
103. Id. at 420.
104. 298 F. 223 (8th Cir. 1924).
105. Id. at 227.
106. E.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co., 69 N.E. 206, 210 (Ind.App.
1903), transferred to the supreme court by specification, 71 N.E. 652 (Ind. 1904) (per
curian).
107. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
108. Id. at 296.
109. Id. at 310-11 (footnote omitted).
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Unfortunately, the cases that rely on the fiduciary-duty-to-creditors theory often do not explain why a fiduciary obligation to creditors
arises apart from the trust-fund concept. Individuals do not owe a fiduciary duty to their creditors. Why should corporations and their employees be different? Two explanations have emerged. In 1894 the senior Justice Harlan, while sitting on the Seventh Circuit, was among the
first to assay a justification. In Sutton Manufacturing Co. v. Hutchinson 1 ° he cited the trust-fund cases, but acknowledged that there was
no trust. He also conceded that individual debtors are free to prefer
whomever they choose. But he thought that insolvent corporations
were different."' Elaborating on a more cryptic statement of the West
Virginia Supreme Court in 1884,1"' he wrote:
[A]s. .. creditors of a private corporation cannot look for their security to the private estate either of the corporators or of those who manage its property, the only recourse of creditors, when a corporation is
dissolved or becomes insolvent and ceases to prosecute its business, is
the property in the hands of its managing officers. The law in effect
says to all who deal with private corporations that they must look to
its property as the only security for the fulfillment of its obligations;
and, if the law gives this assurance to creditors of a corporation, those
who are authorized to represent it in its dealings with the public, who
control and manage its property, and upon whose fidelity and integrity the public as well as creditors rely, ought not to be permitted,
when the corporation becomes insolvent and abandons the objects for
which it was created, to appropriate to themselves as creditors any
more of the common fund in their hands than is ratably their share. 113
For Justice Harlan the underlying rationale for the fiduciary-duty-tocreditors theory was the rule of limited liability of corporate owners
and managers that is derived from treating the corporation as a separate entity. This rationale does not seem persuasive to me. In the first
place, it is not as easy as he suggested to differentiate between individual and corporate debtors on the basis of limited liability. Essentially,
limited liability of corporate owners and managers is like the discharge
in bankruptcy for individuals.114 Both confine creditors to an existing
and limited pool of assets. Even if the individual-corporate difference
were accepted, would not his argument about corporate behavior in insolvency be applicable to all preferences, to outsiders as well as insid-

110. 63 F. 496 (7th Cir. 1894).
111. Id. at 499-503.
112. Lamb v. Laughlin, 25 W. Va. 300, 322 (1884) (stating that when a corporation
becomes insolvent, directors who fail to immediately close the business and "execute
their trust" commit a "fraud upon the public").
113. Sutton Manufacturing, 63 F. at 503.
114. RICHARD A, POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.4, at 375 (3d ed. 1986).
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ers? The limited pool is depleted as much by preferences to outsiders
as by those to insiders. Finally, the question remains why limited liability should translate into a fiduciary, i.e., other than arm's length,
relationship. The existence of limited liability is known to the creditor
when the debtor-creditor relationship is established. Therefore, it
should be possible for the creditor to address this risk contractually in
terms of price or covenant.
In 1903 an Indiana intermediate appellate court advanced a different idea."15 It argued in support of the proposition that corporate directors are trustees for creditors, that insolvency eliminates the interests of stockholders, and that, if the directors do not thereafter
represent creditors, they have no one to represent.1 1 6 Although the
court's argument was not accepted in Indiana,"' it caught on elsewhere
and is still made by both courts and commentators in what might be
thought more persuasive terms. In 1982 the Fourth Circuit stated that
"when the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors.""1 Some scholars
maintain that when a corporation becomes insolvent, its creditors "are
in fact the owners of the firm-the ones who gain or lose as the firm's
fortunes rise or fall.""' Creditors of an insolvent firm have been called
1 20
its "residual owners.
As a way of stating the rule that creditors' claims enjoy priority
over the investments of shareholders and will exhaust the assets of an
insolvent company, the residual ownership proposition is unobjectionable.1 21 But it is not truly accurate to say that the interests of shareholders cease or pass to creditors merely because of insolvency. In the
absence of proceedings that lead to the appointment of a receiver, a
bankruptcy trustee, or the like, the shareholders' interests survive in-

115. City Nat'l Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co., 69 N.E. 206 (Ind. App. 1903),
transferred to the supreme court by specification, 71 N.E. 652 (Ind.1904) (per curiam).
116. Id. at 209-10.
117. After transfer of the case from the intermediate court, the Indiana Supreme
Court chose to adhere to its earlier decision in Nappanee Canning Co. v. Reid, Murdock
& Co., 64 N.E. 870 (Ind.1902) (allowing an insolvent company to prefer a creditor whose
claim was guaranteed by the company's directors), and affirmed a trial court judgment
for the directors. City Nat'l Bank v. Goshen Woolen Mills Co., 71 N.E. 652 (Ind. 1904)
(per curiam).
118. FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 928 (1983).
119. BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 6, at 211.
120. Id. at 1127; accord In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068, 1073 (7th Cir.
1987) (describing creditors in bankruptcy as the "principally affected persons, the new
residual claimants").
121. This formulation is similar to the seductive theory that the assets of an insolvent corporation are a trust fund for creditors. See supra part III(E).
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solvency. Furthermore, insolvency does not entitle corporate creditors
to have the firm managed solely for their benefit. That plight alone
does not entitle the creditors to elect directors"'; nor should it alter
the nature of the directors' obligation to act in the best interest of
their principal. At bottom, the question of fiduciary duty is really a
question of principal and agent. 2 3 For whom are the directors the
agents? Are they agents for the company? Yes. Are they agents for the
shareholders? Yes, at least in some contexts. Are they agents for creditors? I do not believe that the requisite agency relationship arises
merely because of the insolvency of the company. For example, could
the existing creditors of an insolvent company complain if the directors, on behalf of the company, borrow additional funds on terms excessively favorable to the new creditor? I think not. Yet the company
or its shareholders would have the right to complain. The corporation
and the shareholders are principals; the creditors are not.
It is the formality of a receivership, a bankruptcy, or an assignment for the benefit of creditors, not merely insolvency, that changes
the relationships between the parties. 124 These juristic events put the
assets of the company in the hands of a legally constituted entity that
immediately becomes the company's successor and is charged with
representing the interests of both shareholders and creditors. At that
12 5
point a fiduciary duty to creditors certainly arises, but not before.

122. Section 7.21(a) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act provides that

"[o]nly shares are entitled to vote." REVISED MODEL

BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 7.21(a)

(1984).

Official Comment 2 notes that statutes of some states permit bondholders to vote in

specified circumstances. It also states that creditors can attain the power to vote if the
corporation gives them, or their trustee, voting shares; or pledges them shares with voting rights; or grants them share proxies. Id. cmt. 2.

123. Cf. American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Ward, 111 F. 782, 787-88 (8th Cir. 1901)
(stating that as agents, directors' relations with their corporations are of a "fiduciary

character"); Arthur J. Jacobson, CapturingFiduciary Obligation:Shepherd's Law of Fiduciaries,3 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 (1982).
124. E.g., Ward, 111 F. at 787. Judge Easterbrook, in In re Central Ice Cream Co.,

836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987), stated that "[c]reditors outside of bankruptcy may not
challenge the firm's decisions; in bankruptcy they may do so, because they are (presumed
to be) the principally affected persons, the new residual claimants." Id. at 1073. It is
noteworthy that Justice Marshall's statement in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985), that the directors of a company owe a fiduciary
duty to shareholders and creditors, was made in reference to a debtor in possession's

duties in a Chapter 11 case. Id. at 355; see also Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50
(1963) (holding that a Chapter X debtor in possession has the same fiduciary obligation

to creditors as the bankruptcy trustee).
125. Perhaps no case demonstrates the significance of instituting a bankruptcy case
or the like better than In re Martin Custom Made Tires Corp., 108 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1939). In Martin the court allowed a debtor in possession to set aside an unrecorded
chattel mortgage that would have been effective against the debtor outside of bank-

ruptcy. Id. at 173. The court explained its ruling in this fashion: "Adebtor in possession
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Not all contemporary analysts of corporate jurisprudence are will1 26
assert that directors have a fiduciary obligation to creditors.
to
ing
Recent decisions in Delaware 127 and in the Southern District of New
York 2 " have rejected the idea because the creditor has neither a property interest nor an equitable interest in the company. Section 8.30(a)
of the American Bar Association's Revised Model Business Corporation Act requires that a director's dealings be "in the best interests of
the corporation.""' 9 Section 8.61(b) makes a director's "conflicting interest transaction" legitimate if it is "fair to the corporation."" s0 The
American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance acknowl-

holds its powers in trust for the benefit of the creditors. The creditors have the right to
require the debtor in possession to exercise those powers for their benefit." Id. In contrast to Martin is McDonald v. Williams, 174 U.S. 397 (1899), in which the United States
Supreme Court stated:
Insolvency is a most important and material fact, not only with individuals
but with corporations, and with the latter as with the former the mere fact of
its existence may change radically and materially its rights and obligations.
...Although no trust exists while the corporation is solvent, the fact which
creates the trust is the insolvency, and when that fact is established at that
instant the trust arises....
Hence it must be admitted that the law does create a distinction between
solvency and insolvency, and that from the moment when the latter condition
is established the legality of acts thereafter performed will be decided by very
different principles than in a case of solvency.
Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
126. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039,
1050-51 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that creditors are protected by contract), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1012 (1983); 1 R. FRANKLIN BALoTTi & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 5.1 (2d ed. 1990) ("The fiduciary
duty of a director to the corporation and its stockholders ... does not exist as to creditors."). Currently, there is a lively controversy in the academic literature on whether
directors should owe a fiduciary duty to bondholders (creditors). Compare Morey W.
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986) (arguing
that bondholders need this protection) with William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics
and Jurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 667 (arguing that the analysis should be limited to contract law) and Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More
Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 1 (arguing against fiduciary rules, but in favor of an expanded contractual
duty to include an implied covenant of good faith). California allows creditors to bring
derivative actions in the name of the corporation. Douglas P. Wiita, California'sNew
General CorporationLaw: Directors' Liability to Corporations,7 PAc. L.J. 613, 630-38
(1976); see also Note, Creditors'Derivative Suits on Behalf of Solvent Corporations,88
YALE L.J. 1299 (1979) (advocating a derivative right of action for creditors).
127. Simons v. Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 304 (Del. 1988).
128. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1524
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court indicated, however, that the rule may be different in the case
of an insolvent company. Id. at 1524 n.33.
129. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.30(a)(3) (1984).
130. Id. § 8.61(b)(3).
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edges that officers and directors owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation and, on certain occasions, to the shareholders. 131 Any obligation to
creditors, however, is "left to the law of creditors' rights and bank-

ruptcy and to the protection offered under the law of contracts.' 13 2 Curiously, the Reporter's Note1 3 3 cites only Bayliss v. Rood (In re West

Virginia Industries Development Corp.)134 for the view that a duty to
creditors exists. In Bayliss, however, the Fourth Circuit simply ruled

that an argument that no duty to creditors existed was not germane
because the bankruptcy trustee had succeeded to the rights of the
debtor company. 35
2.

Owed to the Corporation

As the Bayliss case implied, a clear basis for condemning insider
preferences, even when outsider preferences are allowed, can be
founded on the fiduciary duty of officers and directors to the corpora-

tion.3 There is no doubt that directors, as agents, have such an obligation to the company, their principal. Indeed, recognition of that duty

made it necessary to determine at the outset whether a director could
become a creditor of the company. Several courts soon ans~vered this

question in the affirmative.137 There is no reason why a loan from a
director to the corporation, if on fair terms, should be deemed improper. Such loans may be necessary and mutually beneficial.
The decision regarding the repayment of an insider loan, however,

131. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 260-61 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1991).

132. Id. § 5.04 cmt. c(1), at 327 (citing Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983)). The Reporters perhaps took their lead from Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: Conflicts of Interest and CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 68 (1966) (stating that insider
loans are "more of a problem of creditors' rights than corporation law").
133. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 131, rep. note 12, at 361.
134. 424 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1970). The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated that directors
of an insolvent company have a fiduciary duty to creditors in FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692
F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983). However, Sea Pines
dealt with a subsidiary that had mortgaged its property to secure a debt owed by its
parent company, id. at 977, and therefore was a classic fraudulent conveyance case.
135. Bayliss, 424 F.2d at 146.
136. E.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971) (suit brought by liquidator challenging actions of sole shareholder); Honn v. Coin
& Stamp Gallery, Inc., 407 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (counterclaim by
corporation in suit brought by director against corporation); see sources cited supra note
123.
137. E.g., Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587, 589 (1875); Gordon v. Preston,
1 Watts 385, 388 (Pa. 1833); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Claghorn, 17 S.C. Eq. (1
Speers Eq.) 545, 562 (Ct. App. 1844).
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presents a different issue. If the company's decision, which is formulated by the directors, to prefer one of their number is grounded, not
on what is in the best interest of the corporation, but rather on what is
the preferred director's interest, then there is a breach of the duty of
loyalty that is owed to the company. I say "is" rather than "can be"
because it seems likely that there are no situations in which the company properly can be described as indifferent on the subject. Surely, an
insider preference impairs corporate credit unless there is some overriding reason for it." 8 In the absence of such a reason, those obligated
by law to make what is best for the company paramount in their decisions have sacrificed the company's interests.
There was an early hint of this line of thought in Buell v. Buckingham & Co., 139 an 1864 Iowa case. In Buell the company, which may or
may not have been insolvent, transferred its plant to its director-president while a judgment creditor's execution sale was pending. In exchange for the plant, the president agreed to cancel a preexisting debt
that the company owed him and to provide the company with funds to
pay some, but not all, of its other obligations. The president in turn
sold the plant to the plaintiff who successfully sought to enjoin the
execution sale.140 The court recognized that the interests of the company and the president might have been in conflict. It ruled, however,
that at most this conflict made the transaction voidable, rather than
void, and not even that at the instance of a creditor whom the court
labelled a "mere stranger.'' 4 1 Similarly, in Stuart v. Larson"" the
court prefaced its discussion of insider preferences by noting the conflict-of-interest danger that is involved when directors deal with their
41
company.'
It must be acknowledged that insider preferences are rarely condemned on the ground that they involve a breach of fiduciary duty to
the corporation. Most of the cases that invoke fiduciary duty have
talked of a duty owed to shareholders and creditors rather than to the
44
corporate entity.1

138. The threat to credit that is premised on a breach of duty to the corporation
was assigned by a student writer as the basis for invalidating insider preferences. Recent
Case, supra note 62, at 521-22.
139. 16 Iowa 284, 291-93 (1864).
140. Id. at 285-86.
141. Id. at 293.
142. 298 F. 223 (8th Cir. 1924).
143. Id. at 225.
144. See supra part III(F)(1).
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3. Why It Matters
The distinction between duties is important for four reasons: First,
it determines who can seek to set aside the preference. Second, it regulates the time within which a party can seek recapture. Third, it bears
on who may be targeted in a recapture proceeding. Most importantly,
breach of duty is more likely to be in issue if the duty is ond owed to
the company.
The Buell court suggested the problem of standing: who can object
to the preference? 45 A creditor, it thought, would have no right to assert a breach of duty owed to the corporation.14 The objection belongs
to the company. Of course, if the company does not complain, a shareholder could do so in a derivative suit. Standing would not be significant in bankruptcy because the trustee, or the debtor in possession, is
the successor to the debtor and can enforce the debtor's causes of action.147 Nor is standing material in nonbankruptcy collective proceedings, such as an assignment for the benefit of creditors, because, again,
the assignee is a successor to the debtor company.148
Standing is an obstacle, however, when an individual creditor of
the corporation brings a nonbankruptcy adversarial action. Lack of
standing might be regarded as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it
avoids the problem, posed by an individual creditor's suit, of replacing
one preference to the insider with another to the successful suitor. On
the other hand, for those who regard the outside creditor, rather than
the company, as the true victim of an insider preference, the creditor's
inability to seek individual redress is objectionable because the company is not likely to challenge an insider preference.
Treating an insider preference as a breach of duty owed to the
debtor company also would free the bankruptcy trustee from the time
constraints of preference or fraudulent conveyance recapture that are
fixed by the Bankruptcy Code.14 9 Whether the transfer was within
ninety days or a year of the petition would be of no moment because
the nonbankruptcy statute of limitations applicable to the corporate
cause of action would be the measure of timeliness. 50 Actually, there is

145. Buell, 16 Iowa at 293.
146. Id. at 293-94.
147. The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate that includes all the
debtor's legal and equitable interests in property. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). The trustee in bankruptcy, or the debtor in possession, is the representative of the estate. Id.
§ 323(a).
148. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN A NUTSHELL 125-32 (4th ed. 1991).
149. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), 548(a) (1988).
150. In fact, 11 U.S.C. § 108 may extend the trustee's time limit for bringing suit. If
the debtor is not time-barred, the trustee may bring an action within the remaining time
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less to this point than first appears. If the theory of recapture is based
on breach of a fiduciary duty owed to creditors, the bankruptcy trustee, who is subrogated to the rights of any actual unsecured creditor
under section 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, is similarly subject to a
nonbankruptcy limitation period.1 '
If breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation is the appropriate
theory, then the obvious target of a recapture action is the party guilty
of the breach, the insider. What, then, of a case like Levit v. Ingersoll
Rand FinancialCorp.,' 5' in which the payment was made to an outside
creditor who had a guarantee from the insider? Does the fiduciaryduty-to-the-company theory immunize the outsider from attack? The
answer, I think, is both yes and no. As a matter of nonbankruptcy law
directed to the breach of a duty owed to the company, the outsider
probably cannot be sued for a breach of duty committed by the insider.' 53 The outsider's debt makes the outsider a bona fide purchaser
in the absence of fraud. But that does not fully solve the Levit problem
because bankruptcy law also condemns preferences and does so generally, whether to an insider or outsider. Bankruptcy preference law only
differentiates creditors in terms of the period of vulnerability.15 ' The
question of an appropriate target, therefore, depends on whether
breach of fiduciary duty or preference is the basis of attack. If preference is the basis, then the appropriate target is determined by bankruptcy law and may well include outsiders.' 55
Finally, although an insolvent company's payment to an insider is
always contrary to the outside creditor's interest, it is possible that
such a payment is not contrary to the interests of the company. In
light of this possibility, a decision must be made about what to do if
fiduciary duty to the corporation is the operative theory. This issue is
addressed in Part IV.
One further point must be emphasized. As a matter of nonbankruptcy law, liability for insider preferences varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. One state may accept the fiduciary-duty-to-creditors thesis. Another may accept the equity argument based on informational
advantage and control. A third may rely on fraudulent conveyance law.
I simply have tried to suggest the deficiencies in all of these theories of

or within two years after the order for relief, whichever is later. 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1988).
151. Id. § 544(b). Thus, trustees commonly invoke § 544(b) and sue under state
fraudulent conveyance law to avoid the one-year limit of § 548.
152. 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
153. Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853), seems to have established
long ago that bona fide creditors and purchasers are not appropriate targets in recapture
actions. Id. at 311.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988).
155. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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invalidation except fiduciary duty to the corporation. These theories,
though defective, are nonetheless accepted. When insider preferences
are outlawed by statute, as under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act, or by some judicial theory other than fiduciary duty to the corporation, that law will govern nonbankruptcy proceedings and bankruptcy proceedings alike. In any case, however, a theory of breach of
duty to the debtor company can provide another weapon in the arsenal
of a debtor's successor.
IV.

THEORY APPLIED

Constructively fraudulent conveyance, recharacterization, inequity, trust fund for creditors, and fiduciary duty to creditors are theories that make all insider preferences by an insolvent company voidable at the instance of a complaining creditor. Once a duty is
recognized, the mere fact that an insider preference occurred justifies
its recapture. There is no question of breach. In contrast, a theory of
actual fraud or of fraudulent conveyance based on actual fraud poses
no question of duty. No one doubts that insiders have a duty to refrain
from fraudulent acts. Establishing a breach of this duty, however, is
problematic.
Similarly, the analysis of insider preferences in terms of fiduciary
duty to the debtor company presents no questions about the existence
of a duty, for that is not controversial. The only question is whether
there is a breach of that duty. For a breach to exist the interests of the
company must have been sacrificed. To say that the interests of the
company and the insider may diverge is not to say that they will diverge in all cases. In some circumstances giving a preference directly to
an insider, or to an outside creditor who is guaranteed by an insider,
can be in the company's best interest. For example, the insider, or the
outsider who is guaranteed by the insider, could be the company's
principal supplier whose continued supply is indispensable to the further operation of the company. In this situation a preference might be
exactly what a management that considers only the company's best interests would choose. Because insider preferences can be either good or
bad for the company, the question becomes whether it makes more
sense to deal with the problem of potentially conflicting interests with
a rule that either condemns or authorizes1 56 all insider preferences, or
to examine insider preferences on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether a conflict existed and whether corporate interests were

156. The authorization, of course, would not protect the transferee from bankruptcy's blanket condemnation of all preferences on the eve of the petition. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 547, 550 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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sacrificed.
Two objections that are based on cost confront anyone arguing for
a case-by-case inquiry.157 Determining what prompted the preference
introduces the additional question of whether the company's interest
was subordinated and proof on this issue would take time and money.
Moreover, this additional element of proof increases the risk of error
and the costs associated with error. Both proof and error costs are
compounded because the legitimacy of the underlying obligation also
must be examined.
In contrast, a rule that either condemns or authorizes insider preferences eliminates the costs of proof and error associated with the
case-by-case inquiry and is therefore at least superficially attractive. A
rule, however, may have its own costs. The effect of a rule on decisions
about both extension of credit and repayment should be taken into
account. From the company's point of view, an approach that does not
have the overall effect of chilling the availability of credit is the most
desirable one. A rule that requires recapture in all insider preference
cases is likely to reduce the amount or increase the cost of credit available from insiders because they will either refuse to extend credit or
charge a higher rate of interest. Arguably, such a rule simultaneously
enhances outsiders' willingness to extend credit, but it is not clear
whether these effects cancel each other. 158 On the other hand, a rule
that immunizes payments to insiders would seem to have a comparable
chilling effect on grants of credit by outsiders that may be offset by the
increased willingness of insiders to extend credit to the company. In
the absence of a firm basis for believing that one source of credit is
clearly more important to debtor companies in general, 59 analyzing either rule's effect on a company's potential creditors provides no basis
for choosing between the two possible rules. It may provide an argument, though perhaps only a modest one, in favor of case-by-case inquiry. If one believes that chilling tends to outweigh encouragement
because people respond more to negative than to positive signals and
157. See POSNER, supra note 114, § 21.1, at 517-18 (identifying error and direct costs
as the costs of a procedural system).
158. Some of the literature suggests that "losses loom larger than gains in human
judgment when the prospects of either are equally probable." Robert E. Scott, Error and
Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking:An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329, 338 (1986). If
this means that positive signals are less powerful than negative ones, avoiding the chilling effect on available credit might be more important to the company than providing

encouragement to creditors.
159. It is consistent with the view that insiders may be a better source of credit for
troubled companies than outsiders to conclude that generalization about inside credit is
impossible because the decision to extend credit is not always made when the company is
in trouble.
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one thus emphasizes minimization of chilling and deemphasizes encouragement, the case-by-case form of resolution becomes more attractive because it would seem to have a much smaller negative effect on
the credit available to the company from both insiders and outsiders.
What would be the effect of the competing rules or the case-bycase inquiry on the company's decision whether to pay the insider? An
ideal approach for the company is one that encourages payments that
benefit the company and discourages payments that do not. A rule that
immunizes insider preferences would encourage, if not guarantee, payment to insiders. Some of these preferential payments would be in the
best interest of the company and some would not. On the other hand, a
rule of recapture would seem to discourage payments to insiders that
are in the best interest of the company as well as payments that are
not. It is not clear, however, that this is the case. I once expressed
doubt about the efficacy of recapture in deterring preferential behavior. I thought that because recapture only required that the preference
be returned to the common fund, debtors and creditors were not much
discouraged from making such transfers by the threat of a return to
the status quo. 1 0 Whatever the effect of a recapture rule on such
transfers, it seems clear to me that the threat of recapture will not
prevent payments to insiders that are thought to be in the company's
best interest. If such payments succeed in reversing the company's bad
fortune, there will be no occasion for recapture. As between the competing rules, therefore, a rule of recapture seems preferable to me because it is at least somewhat more likely to produce a mix of payments
that further the company's interests than is a rule that authorizes insider preferences.
It seems clear, however, that a case-by-case inquiry, even with
some errors, will produce an even more favorable mix of payments.
Those found to be in the company's interest will stand; those that are
not, will fall.
Moreover, in parallel cases involving transactions between directors and their companies, the corporate law tradition seems to have
moved from a condemnatory rule to a case-by-case examination.16 1 At
one time these transactions could be set aside at the instance of the
company without an inquiry into fairness. 62 Later, they came to be
vulnerable for unfairness only when interested directors approved

160. John C. McCoid, II, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression
of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 262-65 (1981).
161. See Marsh, supra note 132, at 36-48.
162. Professor Marsh labels this the rule of "prohibition" and asserts that it was the
general rule in 1880. See id. at 36-39.
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them.163 Today, the rule seems to be that, assuming disclosure of interest and authorization, these transactions are valid if they were fair at
the time they occurred or if they are approved, authorized, or ratified
by a majority of the disinterested directors.164 The fairness issue, when
called into question, is dealt with case by case.
If there is a reason to treat insider preferences by insolvent companies differently, it seems that it would have to lie in the proposition
that the owners of an insolvent company have no incentive to challenge
preferential transfers. This proposition does not hold up, however, in
collective proceedings in which a bankruptcy trustee, a receiver, or an
assignee for the benefit of creditors succeeds to the rights of the debtor
company. As successors of the debtor company, they have standing to
challenge insider preferences, and because preferences affect the creditors whom they represent, they have an incentive to inquire.
Shifting the burden and standard of proof in insider preference
cases may offer an opportunity to reduce the costs associated with the
case-by-case inquiry. If the preferred insider were required to show by
clear and convincing evidence that the preference was in the best interest of the company, it might cut down on the number of instances in
which this position is taken and thus reduce overall proof costs. I do
not believe, however, that changing the standard of proof affects error
costs. 16 5 A trier can as easily go wrong with a clear and convincing standard as with a preponderance of the evidence standard. The standard
of proof merely refle'cts a bias, or the lack of a bias, in favor of a particular outcome. Allocating the burden of proof in accordance with a pre-

163. According to Marsh, this rule of "approval by a disinterested majority" was
firmly in place by 1910. See id. at 39-43.
164. "Judicial review of the fairness of the transaction" is Professor Marsh's label
for this rule, which he asserts was the general rule in 1960. See id. at 43-48. It continues
to be the operative approach. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (1991); AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 131, § 5.02(a)(2)(A); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 8.61(b)(3) (1984). These sources provide other ways to sustain a transfer: authorization, approval, or ratification by directors or shareholders. All three require that the affirming directors or shareholders be disinterested. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1), (2)
(1991); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 131, § 5.02(a)(2)(B), (C); REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 8.62, 8.63 (1984). Professor Marsh had previously acknowledged
that shareholder ratification would suffice. Marsh, supra note 132, at 48-50.
165. Judge Posner asserts that the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt reflects the fact that an erroneous conviction has higher social costs than a mistaken acquittal. POSNER, supra note 114, § 21.3, at 521. Erroneous convictions reduce the
"net expected punishment costs of the guilty" by increasing the cost of acting lawfully.
Id. This in turn reduces the effectiveness of criminal laws in deteriing criminal behavior.
Id. It is not clear to me that this analysis can be transferred to the insider preference
situation in which the burden is on the insider. It is, to me, implicit in Posner's discussion that the standard of proof does not affect the likelihood of error.
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diction of the probabilities, however, can affect, albeit very modestly,161
the chance of error. If the intuition that insiders more often act according to their self-interests is correct, then requiring insiders to disprove
it will reduce the likelihood of error. Not surprisingly, current corporate law puts the burden on directors to prove the fairness of their
dealings with the company, at least when the transaction has not been
authorized by disinterested directors.16 7 There is not much authority
on the standard of proof that directors must meet, but there is some
support for the clear and convincing standard. 68
The choice between a rule or the case-by-case inquiry is frequently
a perplexing one about which reasonable people may differ. The insider
preference case is no exception. I would opt for a case-by-case inquiry
in insider preference cases because I believe it less costly than a rule
and because insider preferences seem indistinguishable from other corporate conflict-of-interest situations. One can argue that the other theories dealing with insider preferences, such as fiduciary duty to creditors, really are based on a different assessment of the relative costs
associated with the rule and inquiry methods. I doubt, however, that
this is correct. The course of development of the law in this area indicates to me that courts have viewed the insider preference problem,
not as insider versus the company, but as insider versus outsider. 69
Actual fraud aside, this perspective involves no rule or inquiry choice
at all because the outsider does not have to show a breach of duty. One
need only decide whether a duty is owed to creditors, an issue which
does not vary from case to case. If a duty exists, granting a preference
is surely a breach of it.
V.

CONCLUSION

There was never any doubt that officers and directors have a duty
to refrain from fraudulent acts that injure outside creditors. The problem with that theory was that, more often than not, there was no fraud
and therefore no breach. Receiving an insider preference was done
openly; no deception was involved. Given the limitations of the early
rule, it perhaps was natural that courts continued to search for some
other duty owed to outside creditors that did not present the proof
problems associated with actual fraud. What made the search difficult

166. Allocating of the burden of persuasion is significant only when the trier is in
equipoise, i.e., when the trier cannot decide one way or the other. Although we cannot be
certain about the frequency of equipoise, presumably it is relatively rare.
167. See supra note 164.
168. See Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 868 (3d Cir. 1968) (construing New Jersey
corporation law).
169. See supra parts III(A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and (F)(1).
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was that it had to be conducted in the context of the debtor's freedom
to prefer one outside creditor over another. Outside bankruptcy, a duty
not to prefer at all was rare. Apart from preference theory, I do not
believe that the courts have successfully established a basis for imposing a duty on directors that is owed to the outside creditors. There is
no persuasive case for the proposition that insiders owe a fiduciary obligation to outside creditors or that insiders should be forbidden from
utilizing the power and informational advantages of their positions.
The theories of constructive fraud and recharacterization seem equally
unsatisfying.
By concentrating on the puzzle of the insider's duty to the outsider, courts have tended to ignore the other available direction: the
relationship between the insider and the company itself. The insider's
duty to the company is beyond cavil; the problems lie in establishing a
breach. The largest problem is whether to conclusively presume a
breach or to consider the question case by case. If the case-by-case inquiry is chosen, there is the further problem of how to fix the burden
and standard of proof. Nonbankruptcy law's solution to these problems
can be found in the parallel situations that involve corporate conflict of
interest. The insider preference case does not seem different enough to
warrant distinctive treatment. The parallel cases use the case-by-case
inquiry and put the burden on the insider to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the transaction was in the best interest of the
debtor company.
Considering insider preferences as a problem of the director's fiduciary duty to the corporation has an additional virtue. By identifying
the wrong as one done to the debtor company, it avoids the inequity
posed when one outsider, suing individually, seeks to displace an insider preference and appropriate its benefit. In this situation one preference simply replaces another. If recapture occurs only when the insider has breached a duty to the company, the fruits of the recapture
will benefit all creditors.
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